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1   Investment treaties can give rise to significant
liabilities for states

Introduction
This note provides an overview of the legal options and
practical mechanisms for states to address concerns
regarding
their
existing
international
investment
agreements (IIAs).

Uncertainty regarding vaguely worded clauses in

2   treaties can trigger costly litigation, and creates
openings for tribunals to give unintended or
incorrect interpretations to treaty provisions

In order to reduce uncertainty, litigation costs, and

3   potential liability, there are various strategies

states can adopt for both their future and existing
treaties

IIAs (which include bilateral investment treaties and free
trade agreements with investment chapters) impose
obligations on host states regarding their treatment of
foreign investors, and typically provide foreign investors a
right to enforce those obligations through investor-state
arbitration. Some IIAs also require host countries to
liberalize their markets and lock countries into those
liberalization commitments. Through those obligations,
IIAs can expose host countries to significant potential and
actual liability, and can have profound impacts on the
development and implementation of industrial and other
public policies. Moreover, once IIAs are concluded, both
their long lives and the power given to investment tribunals
to interpret and apply them, make it difficult for state
parties to those treaties to address unintended and
unforeseen impacts.

For the 3000+ existing treaties, which typically
4   have long lives and survival periods, options
include termination, amendment, and interpretation

  

Interpretation is a relatively efficient tool to achieve
the objectives of adding clarity to and reducing
exposure under existing treaties; to increase its
5   effectiveness, interpretation should be
   incorporated as part of government practice on an
early and ongoing basis
States have been increasingly active in
establishing state agreement on key issues
6   relevant to interpretation of investment treaties, but
there is potential for them to take even greater
   control of their treaties through unilateral, bilateral,
and multilateral actions
Tribunals and counsel should ensure
7   appropriate consideration is being given to
states’ understanding of their treaties

  

While states can take a fresh look at issues regarding the
optimal design and impact of their IIAs when negotiating
new treaties, they are more limited in terms of how they
address issues that have arisen under existing treaties.
Nevertheless, given the number of existing IIAs (over
3,000 worldwide), the potentially broad obligations they
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impose, and their extended duration, it is crucial for states to examine those IIAs and take steps to
clarify uncertainties and ambiguities so that the texts best reflect the signatory states’ intent.
For existing treaties, states have three main options: (1) termination of the treaty, (2) negotiation
of amendments to the treaty (or supplanting existing agreements with new ones), and (3)
interpretations and clarifications of treaty provisions that must be taken into account by tribunals
interpreting the treaties. While all three are important to consider as part of an overall strategy, this
note focuses on the third option as it holds promise as an effective, yet relatively low-cost, avenue
for avoiding unintended effects of treaty obligations.1
States have significant – but as-yet relatively untapped – power over the interpretation and
application of their investment treaties. By issuing joint interpretations with their other treaty
parties, exchanging diplomatic notes, making unilateral declarations, and submitting briefs as nondisputing parties or respondents, states can clarify uncertainties
and ambiguities in treaty texts on a range of jurisdictional,
“… subsequent
procedural and substantive issues such as the meaning of the
agreements and
fair and equitable treatment obligation, the role of the mostsubsequent practice …
favored nation obligation, the significance of the “effective
can provide an avenue
means” test, the scope of consent to arbitration, and a range of
for tribunals to engage
other issues. Under international law on interpretation of
in a dialogue with
treaties, such acts, when evidencing subsequent practice and
states and among each
subsequent agreement, must be taken into account by tribunals
other with a view to
in disputes arising under those agreements.
better harmonize their

own body of

But timing is important to the effectiveness and force of those
jurisprudence….”2
interpretations; and the time is now ripe for states that have
already concluded IIAs – particularly those with the short, vaguely
worded provisions leaving much open to interpretation – to take steps to address the recognized
problems by proactively managing their treaties. This note, drawing on the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, work by various academics, the International Law Commission, and
UNCTAD, aims to aid those steps.

  

Section 1 provides an overview of subsequent agreement and practice and its relevance to treaty
interpretation; Section 2 then describes how subsequent agreement and practice have been
applied and can apply in interpreting investment treaties; Section 3 addresses additional relevant
issues that concern the use of subsequent agreement and practice regarding treaty interpretation;
and Section 4 concludes by providing some practical suggestions for incorporating these ideas.
The annexes illustrate how a patchwork of agreement among states on various treaty provisions
already exists and can be expanded.
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1. General rule of treaty interpretation (VCLT Article 31) and supplementary means of
interpretation (VCLT Article 32)
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides the general rule
on treaty interpretation.3 VCLT Article 31(3) states that treaty interpretation shall take into account
“(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of its provisions; [and] (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”4 Subsequent
agreement and subsequent practice establishing agreement (referred to simply as “subsequent
practice”) are considered to be “objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the
meaning of the treaty,” and are thus deemed “authentic means of interpretation” that must be
applied in interpreting the relevant text.5 As the International Law Commission (ILC) has
explained:
By describing subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31 (3) (a) and (b) as
“authentic” means of interpretation [the ILC] recognizes that the common will of the parties, from
which any treaty results, possesses a specific authority regarding the identification of the meaning
of the treaty, even after the conclusion of the treaty. The Vienna Convention thereby accords the
parties to a treaty a role which may be uncommon for the interpretation of legal instruments in
some domestic legal systems.6
1.1 Subsequent agreement (Art. 31)
A “subsequent agreement” under VCLT Article 31(3)(a) is “an agreement between the parties,
reached after the conclusion of a treaty, regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application
of its provisions.”7 It need not satisfy any requirement of formality, but should constitute some form
of “single common act by the parties by which they manifest their common understanding.”8
1.2 Subsequent practice (Art. 31)
“Subsequent practice” under VCLT Article 31(3)(b) may be defined as “conduct in the application
of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty.” While it carries the same force as a “subsequent agreement” under
Article 31(3)(a), “subsequent conduct” under Article 31(3)(b) may be more difficult to establish
since it is generally made up of conduct that can contribute to an agreement, but that is not
embodied in one common and relatively clear act. Importantly, the “conduct” that can establish
subsequent agreement consists of actions and omissions (including silence) attributable to a party
to a treaty under international law; this can include conduct by state organs, high-ranking as well
as local officials, and even non-state actors.9
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For any conduct to fall under Article 31(3)(b), it must be conduct “in the application of the treaty.”
As the ILC reports, this can be broad:
[It] includes not only official acts at the international or at the internal level which serve to apply
the treaty, including to respect or to ensure the fulfillment of treaty obligations, but also, inter
alia, official statements regarding its interpretation, such as statements at a diplomatic
conference, statements in the course of a legal dispute, or judgments of domestic courts;
official communications to which the treaty gives rise; or the enactment of domestic legislation
or the conclusion of international agreements for the purpose of implementing a treaty even
before any specific act of application takes place at the internal or at the international level.10
Similarly, and as is required for “subsequent agreement” under Article 31(3)(a), “subsequent
practice” under Article 31(3)(b) must seek to clarify the meaning of the treaty or its application.
1.3 Legal force of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice
As noted above, Article 31(3) states that subsequent agreement and subsequent practice must be
taken into account in treaty interpretation, along with other elements such as the ordinary meaning
of the treaty’s terms and its object and character. The fact that it must be taken into account,
however, does not mean that it is “necessarily conclusive, or legally binding. Thus, when the [ILC]
characterized a ‘subsequent agreement’ as representing ‘an authentic interpretation’, it did not go
quite as far as saying that such an interpretation is necessarily conclusive in the sense that it
overrides all other means of interpretation.”11
The ILC’s 2013 report, however, recognizes that the treaty parties can give their subsequent
agreements binding force:
[S]ubsequent agreements and subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties
regarding the interpretation of a treaty must be conclusive regarding such interpretation when
“the parties consider the interpretations to be binding upon them”.12
The intent of the parties to give interpretations such binding effect is particularly clear when the
treaty itself says that subsequent interpretive agreements entered into by the treaty parties will be
binding upon them and/or those interpreting and applying the treaty.13
1.4 Supplemental means of treaty interpretation and other forms of subsequent conduct
(Art. 32)
If interpretation of a treaty in accordance with Article 31 leaves its meaning “ambiguous or
obscure,” or would lead to a result that is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable,” tribunals may turn
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to “supplementary means” of interpretation in accordance with VCLT Article 32.14 Subsequent
practice that does not “establish the agreement of the [treaty] parties” under Article 31 is one type
of information that may be taken into account by tribunals to interpret a treaty in accordance with
Article 32. Such non-Article 31 subsequent conduct can constitute a wide range of actions and
omissions, including conduct by only one or some of the treaty parties; and even conduct by a
state that is not specifically regarding the treaty’s interpretation.15 Much “subsequent practice” that
has been considered by international courts and tribunals when interpreting treaties has been this
broader form of conduct rather than the narrower category of specific actions or omissions
meeting the criteria of Article 31(3).16
The ILC instructs that treaty interpretation is to be conducted as a “single combined operation,”
which places appropriate emphasis on the various mandatory means of interpretation under
Article 31 (i.e., the ordinary meaning of the treaty’s terms, the context of the treaty, its object and
purpose, relevant rules of international law and authentic interpretations by the parties) and
permissive means under Article 32 (e.g., negotiating history and subsequent conduct).17
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2. Subsequent agreement, subsequent practice, and investment treaties
With the rise in investor-state arbitration, states have responded by clarifying their treaty
obligations through interpretive statements added to existing treaties; refining language in new
models and agreements providing “greater certainty” regarding the parties’ understandings of the
treaties’ provisions; exchanging diplomatic notes; and making submissions to tribunals as
respondent-states and non-disputing state treaty parties. As is discussed further below, such
conduct can, in turn, evidence and constitute subsequent agreement and subsequent practice on
treaty interpretation that, under the VCLT, must be taken into account by arbitral tribunals. Parties
to investment treaties have also crafted new procedures and mechanisms to give them even
greater control over interpretation and application of the texts. This section examines these
practices.
2.1 Joint Interpretations through a treaty mechanism
Some investment treaties include provisions stating that the treaty parties can issue
interpretations that will then be binding on investor-state tribunals. By stating in the treaty that the
parties’ agreements are conclusive, the parties remove any doubt regarding their force, and also
might be able to bypass procedural requirements imposed by domestic law that must otherwise be
satisfied before states can enter into other binding international agreements like amendments or
new treaties.
An early and relatively well-known example of a binding-interpretation-provision in an investment
treaty is in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The treaty established a Free
Trade Commission (FTC) made up of cabinet-level representatives of the NAFTA parties or their
designees;18 and Article 1131(2) states that any “interpretation by the [Free Trade Commission]
shall be binding” on investor-state tribunals.
Following NAFTA claims and decisions that triggered concerns by the NAFTA states regarding
tribunals’ interpretations of the “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) requirement, the states used
that FTC mechanism to issue the following interpretation:
Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law
Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investors of another Party.
The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
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A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a
separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article
1105(1).19
Tribunals have accepted that interpretation as controlling – and narrowing – the meaning of the
provision. This, in turn, seems to have benefitted the NAFTA states: UNCTAD’s statistics of
investment treaty cases decided by October 2010 show that tribunals in NAFTA cases found in
favor of investors on their FET claims 22 percent of the time (in 4 out of 18 cases where an FET
breach was alleged). In contrast, in non-NAFTA cases where the investor alleged a breach of the
FET obligation, tribunals found that the state violated the standard in 62 percent of the cases (41
out of 66).20 Although there may be other reasons for these different success rates, it seems likely
that the effort by the NAFTA parties to tighten up the standard has played a role.
The NAFTA also provides that respondent states in an investor-state arbitration may request the
FTC to issue an interpretation regarding whether an exception or reservation will apply.
Interpretations issued on a timely basis by the FTC on the issue are binding on the tribunal.21
The BIT between China and Canada similarly has provisions that expressly enable the state
parties to issue binding interpretations, both general and in particular disputes. Article 18 states
that the “Contracting Parties may take any action as they may jointly decide, including … issuing
binding interpretations of [the] Agreement.” Article 20 then adds that if a respondent state in an
investor-state arbitration invokes a specific exception to the treaty as a defense, the Contracting
Parties are to consult each other in order to determine whether the defense is valid and any
determination they reach on the issue will be binding on the tribunal.
These types of treaty provisions, which are now present in a number of agreements,22 create
special rules giving the parties’ subsequent agreement greater force than it might otherwise have
under Article 31(3) of the VCLT. Nevertheless, as noted above, even in the absence of treaty
language specifically stating that subsequent agreements are binding, at least some authority
indicates that states could give those agreements conclusive force by indicating their intent to be
bound.
2.2. Subsequent agreement under VCLT art. 31(3)(a)
States may establish their agreement on issues of treaty interpretation through a variety of means,
including a joint written instrument, exchange of diplomatic notes, or an oral statement.
The United States, for instance, has exchanged diplomatic notes with eight countries (Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic)
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seeking to clarify specific aspects of the treaties it had concluded with those states. Each
interpretation was designed to ensure that the bilateral investment treaties were deemed to be
consistent with EU law and could be maintained in force when those eight countries joined the
EU.23 The following exchanges of diplomatic notes between the United States and Lithuania
illustrate the content of these subsequent agreements. The United States recorded its
understanding in two separate notes – one for each topic. In the first, it stated:
The Embassy [of the United States of America] confirms the understanding of the Government
of the United States of America that Article IX, paragraph 1, of the Treaty [Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania
for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment] reserves the right of each
Party to take measures that it considers necessary for the protection of its own essential
security interests.
The Embassy further confirms the understanding of the Government of the United States of
America that, in the case of the Republic of Lithuania, these interests may include interests
deriving from its membership in the European Union.
The Ministry would be grateful if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would confirm, by an affirmative
Note in response, that these understandings are shared by the Government of the Republic of
Lithuania.24
In the other note, sent that same day, the Embassy wrote that it:
confirms the understanding of the Government of the United States of America that the
prohibition on performance requirements set forth in Article II, paragraph 6, of the Treaty does
not extend to conditions for the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, such as any
advantage resulting from the establishment of a market organization for agricultural products
and its market stabilizing effects.25
It then requested that Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs respond in writing to affirm that it
shared the United States’ understanding.26
The next day, Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied with two separate written
confirmations that it agreed with the United States on the interpretation of both the essential
security exception and the restriction on performance requirements.27
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Argentina and Panama took similar action in
order to establish their shared understanding of
the most-favored nation provision, exchanging
diplomatic notes with an “interpretative
declaration” stating that the most-favored nation
(MFN) clause in their treaty did not and never
was intended by them to extend to dispute
resolution clauses.28
2.3 Forming subsequent practice through
unilateral statements and actions – with a
focus on submissions
2.3.1 Unilateral conduct – examples from the
investment treaty context
Unilateral conduct may contribute to the
formation of subsequent practice under VCLT
Art. 31(3)(b) when it is explicitly agreed to or
tacitly accepted by other treaty parties.30
To date there are myriad examples of unilateral conduct in the investment treaty context.
For instance, in response to the tribunal’s decision in SGS v. Pakistan reading the “umbrella
clause” in the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT narrowly, the Swiss government sent a letter to the ICSID
Deputy Secretary-General attaching a three-page reaction to the tribunal’s decision and
interpretation of the provision. In the interpretation, Swiss officials stated that they were “alarmed”
by the tribunal’s reading and considered it to be “counter” to the government’s intent and the intent
of other states.31
During the annulment proceedings in Siemens v. Argentina, the United States submitted a letter to
the ad hoc annulment committee explaining its interpretation of several articles of the ICSID
Convention.32
The tribunal in National Grid v. Argentina discussed the role of unilateral conduct in establishing
subsequent practice for the purpose of treaty interpretation. At issue in the case was whether the
MFN provision in the bilateral investment treaty between Panama and the United Kingdom
expanded to cover issues of dispute resolution.
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In support of its argument that the MFN provision did not permit the investor to import more
favorable dispute resolution provisions from other treaties, Argentina pointed to the interpretive
agreement between it and Panama (referred to above) and argued that that understanding
evidenced its state practice. The tribunal, however, concluded that the actions of Argentina and
Panama may have been relevant as a subsidiary means of interpretation under Article 32 but,
standing alone, did not establish subsequent agreement or practice for the purposes of the UKArgentina treaty.
There were three key factors on which the tribunal based its conclusion. The first was that
Argentina had apparently only adopted such an interpretation with Panama and not any of the
approximately 50 other states with which it had investment treaties.33 The second was that the
tribunal appeared to require state practice to establish the state parties’ intent at time of
concluding the treaty.34 And the third was its view that the UK’s state practice signaled a different
understanding.

“…
pleadings
count as
state
practice
…”29
  

The first consideration is valid and provides an important practical lesson
for states. Namely, if a state wishes to clarify certain articles or obligations
of investment treaties that are common in more than one of the agreements
to which it is party, it should (1) ideally seek to establish a clear agreement
on interpretation with the other state party or parties and, (2) make broadly
applicable unilateral statements similarly reflecting their understanding for
treaties where that formal agreement has not been secured. A state can do
this through such means as posting an interpretive declaration on its
website along with its treaties.35
Importantly, by making its positions known to its treaty parties through such
overt acts and statements, a state will have a stronger argument that those
other states – even if silent – agreed with its understanding. Establishing
subsequent practice through action of one party and inaction by another will
likely be much more difficult if the allegedly acquiescing party had no
knowledge of its treaty counterparty’s conduct and views.36

The second factor cited by the tribunal when discounting the significance of the ArgentinaPanama interpretation, in contrast, is questionable. Contrary to the tribunal’s assessment,
subsequent agreement and subsequent practice need not establish that the parties’ had a shared
view of the agreement at the time of concluding the treaty.37 The parties’ interpretations of the
treaty provisions can shift over time, and subsequent practice can be used to establish a common
understanding that was formed years after the treaty entered into force.38
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The third factor the tribunal relied on to support its finding that there was no subsequent practice
within the meaning of VCLT Article 31(3)(b) was its view of the UK’s practice with respect to the
MFN provision. It noted:
Since 1991, the MFN clause in the UK model investment treaty has included a third paragraph
stating that: “For the avoidance of doubt”, the MFN clause extends to Articles 1 to 11 of the
treaty and, hence, to dispute resolution matters. The implication in the wording of this
additional paragraph is that, all along, this was the UK’s understanding of the meaning of the
MFN clause in previously concluded investment treaties. … [I]t is possible to conclude from the
UK investment treaty practice contemporaneous with the conclusion of the Treaty that the UK
understood the MFN clause to extend to dispute resolution…..39
This aspect of the tribunal’s reasoning helps highlight another form of unilateral conduct that can
potentially support subsequent practice under VCLT Article 31(3)(b): development of model texts.
According to the tribunal, the generality of the language used in the model investment treaty and
inclusion of the phrase “for the avoidance of doubt” served as
important evidence of the UK’s understanding of the scope of
the MFN provision in the treaties it had actually concluded.

“[T]he boundary between
interpretation and
potentially impermissible
modification is hazy; even
if modification were
considered a limit …,
interpretation could
support quite an
expansive degree of
change in and of itself.”40

2.3.2 The role of respondent memorials and non-disputing
party submissions
One extremely rich yet currently underexploited form of
unilateral statements that can establish subsequent
agreement and practice are submissions filed by states in
investment disputes – whether acting as a respondent or
as a non-disputing state party to the treaty.

In investment treaty law, much of what we “know” and say
about the law has been developed by tribunals through their
decisions. States’ voices – whether contained in respondent
briefs or submissions by non-disputing parties to the treaty – have, in contrast, commonly
remained out of the public view or been relatively ignored. While awards are increasingly making it
to the public domain, and are being cited as support in other decisions, submissions by states
regarding their understanding of the meaning of their treaties have remained largely hidden, with
only a relatively small number of pleadings by a handful of states being regularly made publicly
available in disputes. What is known about states’ positions on the interpretation and application
of their treaties is often limited to what can be gleaned from quoted or paraphrased excerpts from
their oral and written contributions when those are referenced in awards.

State	
  Control	
  over	
  Interpretation	
  of	
  Investment	
  Treaties	
  

11	
  
  

  

  
The fact that awards are increasingly public but states’ submissions are not weakens states’ role
in shaping the law, and leaves inaccessible a potentially important source of practice that would
have to be taken into account by tribunals under the VCLT. But some states and tribunals have
indeed recognized the important role of state submissions in guiding treaty interpretation. Parties
to the NAFTA and Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA (CAFTA), in particular,
have relatively well-developed and consistent practice of making submissions to tribunals on
issues of treaty interpretation even in cases where they are not respondents.40
The legal relevance of these submissions has been addressed in investor state disputes. In
Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, for instance, the tribunal affirmed that states’
statements and acts, including unilateral submissions as non-disputing state parties to
investment tribunals, and submissions made as respondent states, can establish agreement
under VCLT Article 31(3).41 Looking at the states’ statements and practices in the case before it,
the tribunal determined that the NAFTA parties’ unilateral statements, respondent submissions,
and non-disputing party submissions did not together constitute a “subsequent agreement” under
VCLT Article 31(3)(a).42 The tribunal did find, however, that those unilateral acts and
statements did constitute “subsequent practice” under Article 31(3)(b) sufficient to
“establish[] the agreement of the parties regarding” the treaty’s application that it had to
take into account.43
Because there is no hierarchy among the sources that tribunals must take into account under
VCLT Article 31(3), the fact that the states’ submissions did not qualify as subsequent agreement,
but did count as subsequent practice, did not undermine their legal force. Although subsequent
agreement is clearer on its face than subsequent practice both, when established, must be taken
into account.
Establishing  Agreement:  
“In  the  context  of  ICSID  proceedings,  
Argentina  takes  the  position  that  a  
shareholder  cannot  bring  a  claim  in  respect  of  
harm  done  to  a  company  merely  because  the  
shareholder  has  been  prejudiced  through  a  
diminution  in  the  value  of  the  shares.”  Azurix  
Corp.  v.  Argentina,  ICSID  Case  No.  ARB/01/12,  
decision  on  annulment  (September  1,  2009),  
para.  86  (paraphrasing  Argentina’s  argument).	

    shareholder  claims  
“[A]  minority  non-‐‑controlling  shareholder  
may  not  bring  a  claim  under  the  NAFTA  for  
loss  or  damage  incurred  directly  by  an  
enterprise.”  Gami  Investments  Inc.  v.  Mexico,  
UNICTRAL,  US  Article  1128  submission  by  a  
non-‐‑disputing  state  party  (June  30,  2003),  para.  
20.  	
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Guatemala:  The  State  does  not  accept  that  the  FET/MST  
obligation  includes  a  general  obligation  not  to  act  
arbitrarily  (para.  397),  to  act  transparently  (para.  409),  or  
to  protect  investors’  “legitimate  expectations”.	

El  Salvador:    "ʺ[T]he  requirement  to  provide  ‘Fair  and  Equitable  
Treatment’  under  CAFTA  Article  10.5  does  not  include  obligation  of  
transparency,  reasonableness,  refraining  from  mere  arbitrariness,  or  
not  frustrating  investors’  legitimate  expectations.”  	

Honduras:  :debido  a  que  el  enfoque  
debe  ser  en  la  conducta  del  Estado,  la  
Republica  de  Honduras  no  considera  
valido  ni  necesario  hacer  referencia  a  
las  expectativas  de  los  inversionistas  
para  decidir  si  se  ha  violado  el  nivel  
minimo  de  trato.”    	

Canada:  The  FET/MST  obligation  
“does  not  require  the  protection  of  
legitimate  expectations  or  
transparency.”    	

Argentina:  “Respondent  …  argues  
that  customary  international  law  
recognizes  neither  legitimate  
expectations  nor  legal  stability  as  
essential  elements  to  the  Fair  and  
Equitable  Treatment  standard.”	

Establishing  
Agreement:	
understanding  	
of  FET	

United  States:  "ʺTo  suggest  …    that  
Article  1105  [FET/MST]  provides  a  
basis  for  an  investor  to  submit  a  claim  
under  Chapter  Eleven  for  mere  
frustration  of  a  legitimate  expectation  
is  nonsensical….  [S]uch  a  claim  lacks  
support  in  State  practice…."ʺ	

Figure 2
Notably, in agreeing with the respondent about the use of subsequent agreement and practice in
treaty interpretation, the tribunal rejected the claimant’s contention that by allowing states this role,
tribunals would enable them to improperly “taint” interpretation of the treaty and distort original
intent through “revelation or revision by NAFTA Party officials subsequent to their learning that a
NAFTA claim has been commenced.”44
ADM v. Mexico represents another case where the tribunal relied on positions taken by NAFTA
states in their submissions as respondents and non-disputing state parties in various NAFTA
disputes, as well as in related domestic court proceedings, to establish the meaning of the treaty
and conclude that, contrary to the claimants’ contention, the NAFTA only accorded procedural,
and not substantive, rights to investors.45
To illustrate the role and relevance of briefs in demonstrating state agreement on treaty standards,
the figures above and the tables included in the annex below collect submissions by various
states – some acting as a non-disputing party or as a respondent state – on the particularly
contentious issue of the meaning of the fair and equitable treatment obligation. In Table 1 of the
annex, each state contends that the obligation requires no more than the minimum standard of
treatment; in Table 2, each submission declares the state’s position that the standard does not
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entail a requirement to protect investors’ “legitimate expectations.” Although they contain just a
small sampling of the information that can be gleaned from briefs, the annex and the figures
provide a glimpse into how one can identify common positions reflecting agreement on various
contentious treaty issues.
Five factors are helping advance states’ use of briefs to give content to treaty standards and
reduce uncertainty regarding how they will be interpreted and applied: (1) the growth in the
number of treaties requiring pleadings to be made publicly available, (2) practices of states
voluntarily disclosing their briefs, (3) explicit inclusion in treaties like the NAFTA and CAFTA of
mechanisms for non-disputing state parties to make submissions to tribunals, (4) the 2013
UNCITRAL arbitration rules requiring disclosure of pleadings and requiring tribunals to accept
submissions by non-disputing state parties on issues of treaty interpretation 46 and (5) raised
awareness and interest of states in asserting their roles as masters of their treaties.47 Through
these practices, the skeletal but illustrative collection reproduced in the figures above and in the
annex can grow into a more well-developed framework evidencing authentic interpretations of
investment treaties to be considered by tribunals.
As noted above, in addition to these relatively formal types of conduct such as submissions to
tribunals and diplomatic exchanges, practice can also take other, less formal forms, such as
statements posted on a government’s website along with its treaties, and less active forms, such
as tacit acceptance of another treaty party’s position.48 In the context of the NAFTA, because of
the numbers of disputes that have been brought against the United States, Canada, and Mexico
under that single treaty, each state party has had roughly 50 distinct disputes giving rise to issues
and questions for them to weigh in on with interpretations. In contrast, many other states and
many other treaties have figured less prominently in investor-state arbitration, meaning that there
are fewer opportunities to provide input. For these states and treaties, joint and unilateral action
other than submissions in briefs will be particularly important for attempting to fine-tune treaties’
meaning.
With respect to the issue of tacit acceptance, submissions by non-disputing state parties on
certain issues commonly seek to prevent tribunals from drawing unintended inferences from
silence of others. The submissions often state that they only aim to address discrete questions of
interpretation, that silence on other issues should not be interpreted to have any meaning, and
that the submitting party is not taking a position on how the relevant interpretation will apply in the
relevant dispute based on the facts of the case.49
Also relevant to the issue of silence, one notable development in investment treaties is for the
parties to state what significance, if any, should be attributed to the non-disputing party’s failure to
provide input in a dispute. The 2012 U.S. Model BIT illustrates this practice, stating that if a nondisputing party does not provide an oral or written submission regarding the respondent state’s
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attempt to invoke certain defenses, “the non-disputing Party shall be presumed, for the purposes
of the arbitration, to take a position [on the applicability of the defense] not inconsistent with that of
the respondent.” 50
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3. Other issues and considerations – timing, third-party rights, interpretation v.
amendment, state-to-state arbitration, and unintended attribution
3.1 The timing of the interpretation
Actions taken during the course of a dispute to establish subsequent practice or agreement may,
rightly or wrongly, be viewed as improper tactics to avoid liability rather than legitimate efforts to
clarify vague standards. Indeed, the timing of interpretations has seemed to influence both the
Pope & Talbot tribunal’s critical view of the FTC interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105, and the
United States’ view of Ecuador’s efforts to secure common interpretation of the “effective means”
provision (see below sections 3.3 and 3.5). Both the FTC’s interpretation and Ecuador’s attempt at
a joint interpretation came after a tribunal had issued its decision on liability in favor of the
claimants, and both were questioned as attempts to interfere with those awards.51
To avoid these concerns, it would be ideal for states to take steps to clarify the meaning of their
treaties on a prompt and ongoing basis, especially before disputes arise. Nevertheless, even
submissions by respondent states in pending disputes do qualify as conduct that can establish
subsequent agreement on interpretation; and submissions by non-disputing state parties can
likewise be used to guide interpretation and application of the treaties in ongoing arbitrations.
Indeed, as shown by the growing body of treaties expressly granting states the ability to make
binding determinations, states have deemed it important to be able to control interpretation and
application of their treaties by ensuring their ability to conclusively determine even investors’
pending claims.52
3.2 Relevance of third-party rights
As noted above, subsequent agreement and subsequent practice may not necessarily be binding,
and, pursuant to Article 31 of the VCLT, tribunals must also take into account other means of
interpretation including the object and purpose of the treaty. In this context, one relevant factor
that might impact the weight a tribunal gives to subsequent agreement and practice is the effect it
would have on non-parties to the treaty. Where interpretations solely impact the scope and nature
of the parties to the treaty, tribunals may not be concerned about potential abuse. But where
interpretations narrow rights or interests of non-parties to the treaties, as might be the case under
human rights or investment treaties, tribunals might accord them less weight.53 The ILC, for
instance, noted in a footnote that “[i]t had been asserted that the interpretation of treaties which
establish rights for other states or actors is less susceptible to ‘authentic’ interpretation by their
parties, for example in the context of investment treaties.”54
Georg Nolte, the Special Rapporteur for the ILC’s work on “Subsequent agreements and
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties,” has addressed these issues. He
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responded to concerns about the power of states to affect interpretation of their investment
treaties by affirming the enduring value of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice:
The comparatively limited use of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice by ICSID
tribunals as means of treaty interpretation or modification has been criticized. The point has been
made that the reluctance of the tribunals may be due to the consideration that a wider use of
subsequent practice would give states an inappropriate possibility to retroactively affect and
diminish the rights of private investors. This consideration would, however, underestimate the role
of states as masters of the treaty and law-givers. The jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights indeed demonstrates that an international court can guarantee fundamental rights
and at the same time amply take subsequent practice of the parties into account as a pragmatic
orientation for where to draw the line between rights and possible limitations. In addition, taking
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice more into account can provide an avenue for
tribunals to engage in a dialogue with states and among each other with a view to better
harmonize their own body of jurisprudence, and thus to compensate somewhat for the lack of a
common appeals procedure.55
There is thus nothing inherent in or about investment treaties’ investor protections that preclude
states’ use of subsequent agreement and practice to shape treaty interpretation. Those sources
remain valid and useful, though issues relating to timing of the clarification and the existence,
nature and scope of impacted third-party rights might affect the weight a tribunal gives to evidence
of subsequent agreement and practice in a particular dispute.56
3.3 The line between interpretation and amendment
The line between interpretation and amendment can be blurry and difficult to define.57 But
international law appears not to give the distinction determinative weight, accepting as
authoritative even those interpretations that are inconsistent with the plain text and original intent
of the state parties to the treaty.58 Indeed, it is well-settled that the meaning of treaties may
change over time as states’ understanding of the texts’ aims and effects evolves. Subsequent
agreement and subsequent practice can be used to evidence and establish that evolution.59
There are, however, arguments that interpretation and amendment are and should be considered
distinct.60
Some of those issues relating to the interpretation/amendment distinction arose in connection with
the NAFTA states’ efforts to clarify the meaning of their investment treaties. In response to the
FTC interpretation of the FET obligation, investor claimants argued that the FTC statement was an
improper amendment, and not an interpretation binding on tribunals. The issue first arose in Pope
& Talbot v. Canada,61 a case that was well underway when the NAFTA parties issued their FTC
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interpretation. The Pope & Talbot tribunal considered the FTC statement to be an amendment to
the treaty rather than an interpretation,62 but concluded that its findings of liability would stand
irrespective of whether it applied the standard set forth in that statement or the one that it had
applied.63
In contrast, subsequent tribunals have been less concerned about the interpretation/amendment
divide. For instance, the tribunal in ADF v. United States, a NAFTA case that had also been
commenced when the FTC interpretation was issued, stated:
[T]he Investor urges that the Tribunal, in the course of determining the governing law of a
particular dispute, is authorized to determine whether an FTC interpretation is a “true
interpretation” or an “amendment.” We observe in this connection that the FTC Interpretation of 31
July 2001 expressly purports to be an interpretation of several NAFTA provisions … and not an
“amendment,” or anything else…. Nothing in NAFTA suggests that a Chapter 11 tribunal may
determine for itself whether a document submitted to it as an interpretation by the Parties acting
through the FTC is in fact an “amendment” which presumably may be disregarded until ratified by
all the Parties under their respective internal law. We do not find persuasive the Investor’s
submission that a tribunal is impliedly authorized to do that as part of its duty to determine the
governing law of a dispute…Such a theory … overlooks the systemic need not only for a
mechanism for correcting what the Parties themselves become convinced are interpretative errors
but also for consistency and continuity of interpretation, which multiple ad hoc arbitral tribunals are
not well suited to achieve and maintain.64
Because the NAFTA specifically states that treaty interpretations by the FTC are binding, tribunals
handling claims under that treaty may be more willing to accept the controlling nature of FTC
interpretations, and less willing to question whether they are amendments, than tribunals might be
when the relevant treaty does not contain a similar mechanism.
Yet even outside the context of the NAFTA and its provision regarding binding FTC
interpretations, the distinction between interpretation and amendment in investment treaties may
in many situations have limited practical impact due to the vague nature of many provisions in
those agreements: when treaties set forth obligations as broad standards rather than specific
rules, it is likely there will be more room (and need) for interpretations to provide guidance as to
what those standards actually mean.66 As evidenced by the lengthy and costly litigation on the
meaning of covered “investors” and “investments”, the FET obligation, the line between legitimate
regulations and expropriations, the elements and scope of the non-discrimination obligations, and
many other provisions, there is much room for clarification and correspondingly little danger that
the clarification will depart from treaty text in such a way that it looks like an amendment.
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3.4 Unintended attribution

“The importance of such
subsequent practice in
the application of a
treaty, as an element of
interpretation, is
obvious; for it
constitutes objective
evidence of the
understanding of the
parties as to the
meaning of the treaty.”65

Because actions attributable to states under international law
can constitute subsequent practice influencing treaty
interpretation, it is important for states to ensure that their
conduct conveys the right meaning. States that have
adequate knowledge and resources to follow investment
disputes arising under their treaties and participate in those
disputes whether as respondents or non-disputing state
parties, have a greater ability to manage their messages than
states lacking such capacity. States that outsource and are
not adequately involved in their defense or knowledgeable
  
about relevant legal issues may unwittingly concede points or
take stances not consistent with their actual understanding of their treaties. Even where briefs are
drafted and submitted by private lawyers, states can be bound by their contents.
Another issue regarding attribution relates to state-owned or –controlled enterprises acting as
claimants. If a state-owned or –controlled entity of State A brings an investment treaty action as a
claimant against respondent host State B, that entity’s arguments about the treaty’s provisions
may be more investor-friendly than arguments made by State A when acting as a respondent
state (or even as a non-disputing state party). Due to these issues, provisions in treaties, arbitral
rules, and domestic law that require home states to be notified of disputes filed under their treaties
and receive documents submitted to and issued by tribunals, and that also allow them to make
submissions to tribunals, are especially important.
3.5 State-to-state arbitration

When one state seeks to clarify an issue of treaty interpretation, the other state may respond by
agreeing, disagreeing, or remaining silent. The examples cited above have largely illustrated
circumstances in which states have agreed – either through joint statements, exchanges of
diplomatic notes, or unilateral submissions to tribunals taking common positions on questions of
interpretation.
But agreement may not always be so easy, particularly when the capital flows between the treaty
parties are largely one-directional.67 The state that is predominantly the capital importing treaty
party might face challenges getting the capital exporting treaty party to respond to, much less
support, a request for an express statement setting forth the states’ shared understanding of a
treaty provision, especially if that understanding were one designed to advance a narrow view of
states’ obligations to foreign investors.68

State	
  Control	
  over	
  Interpretation	
  of	
  Investment	
  Treaties	
  

19	
  
  

  

  
In these circumstances, as discussed above, a state may and should still take steps to make its
own reading of the treaty known through such unilateral actions as postings on its website.
It might also be able to initiate formal action under the investment treaty to compel state-to-state
consultations on the issue, or have a tribunal decide the question of interpretation.
Ecuador pursued the strategy of formal state-to-state dispute resolution after unsuccessfully
seeking express agreement from the United States on a provision in the bilateral investment treaty
between the two countries. Objecting to the interpretation a tribunal in an investor-state dispute
had given to the “effective means” provision in the US-Ecuador BIT,69 Ecuador informed the
United States of its view of the proper interpretation, and asked for confirmation that the United
States shared Ecuador’s understanding.70 After the US declined to respond to Ecuador’s request,
Ecuador initiated an arbitration against the United States under the investment treaty. The tribunal
ultimately dismissed the action, finding that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter because
there was no “dispute” between the United States and Ecuador.71
That decision, however, has been criticized both by the dissenting member of the tribunal and by
academics.72 Particularly in light of these critiques, it is uncertain whether future tribunals would
take a similarly hands-off approach to cases in which one party to a BIT refuses to engage with
the other state party’s efforts to resolve issues of treaty interpretation.
A final note on the practical challenges that arise with different states having different stakes in
clarifying their treaties is that the investment treaties themselves can potentially help address
these issues. As noted above, treaties can state that silence in response to a respondent state’s
position on some or all issues of interpretation in a dispute should be read as accepting (or not
opposing) that interpretation. Many treaties also contain provisions stating that the parties must
consult to resolve “issues” or “disputes” regarding treaty interpretation and/or application. States
could potentially draft those “obligation to consult” articles more explicitly to ensure their requests
for interpretations are answered.
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4. Conclusions for practical steps and considerations
The infamously vague language in existing investment treaties means that tribunals, investors,
and states spend much time and resources trying to establish more precisely the implications of
those agreements. States can help provide this clarity, and, in doing so, control the scope of their
potential liability (and litigation costs) under their existing, long-lasting investment treaties.
Whether inserted as an explanatory note appended to a treaty, developed in model agreements,
asserted in non-disputing state party submissions, explained in respondents’ pleadings, or
conveyed by other means, these statements and practices must be taken into account by
tribunals.
Even through the simple approach of making submissions to tribunals public as a matter of
course, states help establish a “matching” mechanism enabling them to identify positions they
share with other treaty parties. To date, however, states’ briefs have rarely been making it into the
public domain, preventing them from playing the role they could play in shaping development of
and promoting coherence in investment treaty law.
In order to retain greater control over the interpretation of their treaty obligations, and in
accordance with their rights under international law governing treaty interpretation, states can and
should take a number of concrete steps:
In their treaties, states can insert provisions
• ensuring that their joint interpretations on some or all issues are binding on tribunals;
• governing the meaning given to silence on certain matters;
• encouraging (if not requiring) state parties to consult and cooperate to resolve ambiguities
on questions of interpretation and/or application;
• requiring that home states or other non-disputing state parties (1) are notified of claims filed
under their treaties, (2) receive documents submitted to and issued by tribunals, and (3)
can make submissions to tribunals on issues of treaty interpretation.
In disputes, states can
• remain informed on the interpretation and application of their treaties;
• make their submissions public;
• participate as non-disputing state parties in disputes arising under those agreements; and
• make clear when they disagree with interpretations given by tribunals.
Alone and with other countries, states can
• make public their understanding of vague or uncertain treaty provisions through unilateral
action (e.g., postings on a website listing their treaties);
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•
•

monitor statements and practice of their treaty parties to identify areas of agreement and
disagreement; and
cooperate with other states to establish agreement clarifying ambiguous language, and
clarify whether they intend those agreements to be binding.

States’ counsel can and should also play an important role in helping their clients carefully
manage interpretation of their treaties through subsequent agreement and subsequent practice,
as opposed to simply addressing issues on a case-by-case basis as they arise through costly
litigation of disputes. And finally, tribunals have a crucial responsibility to ensure that they properly
apply rules of treaty interpretation and give adequate consideration to states’ understanding of
their treaties.
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Table 1. Link with MST Asserted in Submissions
Country
Argentina

Canada

Czech
Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Guatemala

Clarification of FET/MST Link
According to reference to “‘Fair and Equitable Treatment according to the
Principles of International Law’” is a reference to and coextensive with the
“minimum standard of objective treatment” under “customary international law”
and not an “autonomous and independent standard.” EDF International
S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, award (June 11, 2012), para.
343 (noting the respondent’s position)
(link not express in the treaty)
“[T]he Note of Interpretation rejects the interpretation of ‘fair and equitable
treatment’ … as a standard of fairness autonomous of the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment. It confirms that customary international law is
the applicable source of law to determine the minimum standard of treatment
under Article 1105(1), and that ‘Article 1105 requires no more, nor less, than the
minimum standard of treatment demanded by customary international law.” V.G.
Gallo v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 55798, respondent’s countermemorial (June 29, 2010), para. 262.
(link not express in the treaty)
Treaty reference to the “fair and equitable treatment” standard is a reference to
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment. Saluka
Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNICITRAL, partial award (March 17, 2006),
para. 289 (noting the respondent’s position)
(link not express in treaty)
“The fair and equitable treatment provision also does not create new, treaty-based
standards, but merely incorporates or references the minimum standard of
treatment under customary international law.” Chevron Corporation and Texaco
Petroleum Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 200923, track 2 counter-memorial on the merits of the Republic of Ecuador (February
18, 2013), para. 387.
(link not express in treaty)
“The text of CAFTA makes it clear that ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ is a ‘floor’ or
‘bottom’ to the acceptable treatment of foreign investments – treatment that does
not fall below this minimum standard does not give rise to a treaty violation, even
if such treatment may not be considered ideal by a party or a tribunal.” Railroad
Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23,
submission by non-disputing state party, El Salvador (January 1, 2012), para. 3.
(link express in the treaty)
“Article 10.5 of CAFTA limits the Parties’ fair and equitable treatment obligation to
the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law. A claimant
alleging a violation of the minimum standard of treatment under customary law
bears two burdens: first, as examined in this section, it must prove as a matter of
law that this particular standard of treatment is within the scope of the minimum
standard of treatment under customary international law; second, … it must prove
as a matter of fact that the respondent State violated that particular standard of
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treatment.” Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/23, respondent’s counter-memorial on the merits (October 5,
2010), para. 346.
Honduras

Sri Lanka

(link express in the treaty)
“El trato justo y equitativo’ solamente se menciona con el rango de un ‘concepto’
que esta incluido en el_’Nivel Minimo de Trato.’ El segundo parrafo del [CAFTA]
Articulo 10.5 establece claramente que este concepto de ‘trato justo y equitativo’
no puede ir mas alla del nivel minimo de trato a los extranjeros segun el derecho
intemacional consuetudinario.” Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic
of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by non-disputing state
party, Honduras (Jan. 1, 2012), para. 5.
(link express in the treaty)
The “fair and equitable treatment” requirement is tied to the minimum standard of
treatment under customary international law. Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka,
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, award (October 31, 2012), para. 414 (discussing the
respondent’s position).
(link not express in the treaty)

United
States

Under the NAFTA, “ ‘[F]air and equitable treatment’ … do[es] not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.’” ADF Group Inc. v.
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, US counter-memorial
on competence & liability (November 29, 2001), p. 50.
(link not express in the treaty)
The provisions of the CAFTA-DR demonstrate the “Parties’ express intent to
incorporate the minimum standard of treatment required by customary
international law as the standard for treatment in CAFTA-DR Article 105.
Furthermore, they express an intent to guide the interpretation of that Article by
the Parties’ understanding of customary international law, i.e., the law that
develops from the practices and opinio juris of States themselves, rather than by
interpretations of similar but differently worded treaty provisions. The burden is on
the claimant to establish the existence and applicability of a relevant obligation
under customary international law that meets these requirements.” Railroad
Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23,
submission by non-disputing state party, United States of America (January 31,
2012), para. 3.
(link express in the treaty)

Table 2. State Submissions on Content of FET or FET/MST
Country
Argentina

Stance (as disputing or non-disputing State party to the treaty) on FET
and/or MST
“Respondent … argues that customary international law recognizes neither
legitimate expectations nor legal stability as essential elements to the Fair and
Equitable Treatment standard. (See, Respondent‘s Rejoinder, at paras. 249-50,
255). Respondent asserts that such broad interpretation extending to the
protection of legitimate expectation constitutes a legislative expansion
inconsistent with the contracting parties’ intentions as well as the principles of
treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.” EDF
International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and Leon Participaciones
Argentinas S.A. v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, (June 11,
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2012), para. 359 (paraphrasing respondent’s arguments)
Canada

The FET/MST obligation sets an “absolute minimum ‘floor below which treatment
of foreign investors must not fall.” V.G. Gallo v. Government of Canada,
respondent’s counter-memorial (June 29, 2010), para. 263.
The FET/MST obligation “does not require the protection of legitimate
expectations or transparency.” V.G. Gallo, respondent’s counter memorial, p. 95,
heading D.1.
Claimants have “submitted no evidence of practice of the three NAFTA Parties
regarding the protection of legitimate expectations, let alone evidence of practice
by any of the other 189 members of the United Nations, as would be necessary to
prove that a rule of custom crystallized through widespread and consistent
practice undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation.” Mobil Investments Canada
Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Government of Canada, respondent’s reply
post-hearing brief (January 31, 2011), para. 98.

Czech
Republic

The treaty’s FET obligation (which is not expressly linked to the MST in the treaty)
requires an examination of the “governmental action in question was willfully
wrong, actually malicious, or so far beyond the pale that it cannot be defended
among reasonable members of the international community.” Saluka
Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNICTRAL, partial award (Mach 17, 2006),
para. 290.

Guatemala

The FET/MST obligation does not “ ‘create additional substantive rights.’ ”
Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/23, respondent’s counter-memorial (October 5, 2010), para. 348 (internal
citations omitted).
The claimant has not established, and the State does not accept that the
FET/MST obligation includes a general obligation not to act arbitrarily (para. 397),
to act transparently (para. 409), or to protect investors’ “legitimate expectations”
(paras. 424-428). Railroad Development Corporation, respondent’s countermemorial.

El Salvador

“The text of CAFTA makes it clear that ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ is a ‘floor’ or
‘bottom’ to the acceptable treatment of foreign investments – treatment that does
not fall below this minimum standard does not give rise to a treaty violation, even
if such treatment may not be considered ideal by a party or a tribunal.” Railroad
Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23,
submission by non-disputing state party, El Salvador (January 1, 2012), para. 3.
The FET/MST obligation does not “ ‘create additional substantive rights.’ ”
Railroad Development Corporation, submission by non-disputing state party, El
Salvador, para. 3 (internal citations omitted).
In El Salvador's view, to violate the minimum standard of treatment under
customary international law included in CAFTA Article 10.5, a measure to be able
to the State “must be sufficiently egregious and shocking – a gross denial of
justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process,
evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons – so as to fall below accepted
international standards… Conversely, … the requirement to provide ‘Fair and
Equitable Treatment’ under CAFTA Article 10.5 does not include obligation of
transparency, reasonableness, refraining from mere arbitrariness, or not
frustrating investors’ legitimate expectations.” Railroad Development Corporation,
submission by non-disputing state party, El Salvador, paras. 6-7.
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Honduras

“Debido al origen de "Nivel Minimo de Trato" en el derecho internacional
consuetudinario, como un "piso" absoluto que complementa la obligaci6n de los
Estados de otorgar a los extranjeros al menos el mismo nivel de trato que los
Estados otorgan a sus propios nacionales, solam.ente acciones de caracter
chocante, excesivo, ultrajante, de parte de un Estado, pueden violar el nivel
minimo de trato, incluyendo el trato justo y equitativo como un concepto incluido
en el nivel minimo de trato.
“La Republica de Honduras considera validos los siguientes ejemplos especificos
de conducta que puede violar el nivel mfnimo de trato: una grave denegaci6n de
justicia., tma arbitrariedad manifiesta, una injusticia flagrante, una completa falta
de debido proceso, una discriminacion manifiesta, o la ausencia manifiesta de las
razones para una decision. Sin embargo, debido a que el enfoque debe ser en la
conducta del Estado, la Republica de Honduras no considera valido ni necesario
hacer referencia a las expectativas de los inversionistas para decidir si se ha
violado el nivel minimo de trato.” Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic
of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by non-disputing state
party, Honduras (January 1, 2012), paras. 9-10.

Sri Lanka

“The obligation of fair and equitable treatment is in Respondent’s view not
breached where regulatory measures serve a legitimate purpose and are based
on legal standards, rather than prejudice or personal preference. Even if,
hypothetically, legislation were objectively imperfect, this does not violate fair and
equitable treatment. A fortiori, imperfect implementation of existing regulation is
no breach of the international standard.” Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, award (October 31,
2012), para. 416 (paraphrasing the respondent’s position).

United
States

“States may modify or amend their regulations to achieve legitimate public welfare
objectives and will not incur liability under customary international law merely
because such changes interfere with an investor's ‘expectations’ about the state
of regulation in a particular sector. Regulatory action violates ‘fair and equitable
treatment’ under the minimum standard of treatment where, for example, it
amounts to a denial of justice, as that term is understood in customary
international law, or manifest arbitrariness falling below the international minimum
standard.” TECO Guatemala Holdings LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/23, art. 10.20.2 submission of a non-disputing state party, United
States of America (November 23, 2012), para. 6.
“[A] claim under Article 1105 [FET/MST] would not be admissible if it were based
only on an allegation of a breach of another provision of the NAFTA.” United
Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNICTRAL, second
article 1128 submission of the United States of America (May 13, 2002).
“Sufficiently broad State practice and opinio juris thus far have coincided to
establish minimum standards of State conduct in only a few areas, such as the
requirements to provide compensation for expropriation; to provide full protection
and security (or a minimum level of internal security and law); and to refrain from
denials of justice. In the absence of an international law rule governing State
conduct in a particular area, a State is free to conduct its affairs as it deems
appropriate.” Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, counter-memorial on merits and objections to
jurisdiction of respondent United States of America (December 14, 2012), para.
353.

“To suggest … that Article 1105 [FET/MST] provides a basis for an investor to
submit a claim under Chapter Eleven for mere frustration of a legitimate
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expectation is nonsensical…. In addition to the fact that such a claim lacks
support in State practice, the consequences of agreeing with Glamis that mere
frustration of a foreign investor’s legitimate expectations rises to the level of a
customary international law violation would be momentous…. In sum, the Tribunal
should reject the notion that the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment requires States to compensate foreign investors merely because their
expectations have been frustrated. Glamis provides no evidence of such a rule of
customary international law and, indeed, State practice refutes it.” Glamis Gold
Ltd. v. United States of America, UNICTRAL, counter-memorial of respondent
United States of America (September 19, 2006), pp. 180-84.
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The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law School
and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is a leading research center and forum dedicated
exclusively to the study, practice and discussion of sustainable international investment (SII)
worldwide. Through research, advisory projects, multi-stakeholder dialogue and educational
programs, CCSI constructs and implements an investment framework that promotes sustainable
development, builds trusting relationships for long-term investments, and is easily adopted by
governments, companies and civil society.  
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